

# Monitoring Summary



Kevin Dodds  
BP Alternative Energy

Susan Hovorka  
BEG/UT

Japan 2009

Natchez 2010

Potsdam 2011

- Key Categories
  - Regulatory
  - Management
  - Technology
  - Challenges


Joint Network New York

- How have we scored

# Risk Profile



Uncertainty vs Risk Profile of a CGS Project and relationship of monitoring modes





# Tokyo 2009

## International Monitoring Projects

- Ketzin, Germany
- Lacq Rouse, France
- Gorgon, Australia
- Update ETI monitoring review, EPA BEG CCP monitoring study

## What Regulators Want

- EPA Victoria and CO2CRC – Panel discussion
- Regulation of EU and US state regulations

## Reality Check – What monitoring can and can't do

- Quantification
- Otway atmospheric and soil monitoring
- Strengths and weaknesses


## Emerging and Innovative Monitoring Technologies

- InSAR
- Real time integrated monitoring
- Electrical monitoring
- Thermal monitoring

Visit Nagaoka site

(14/17)

## Dissolved CO<sub>2</sub> @ OB-2



# Conclusions 2009



- Learn through pilot projects
- Leakage “innocent until proven guilty”
- Challenge in monitoring edge of plume, imaging and/or pressure
- Monitor geochemistry
- Multiscale data sets



# Natchez 2010

## • Reports from Projects Networks and Research

- Risk assessment and Environmental Impacts workshop
- CO2Remove and Otway
- What we have learnt
- Ketzin and RCSP
- Feature Japan and CCS projects

## • US and Canadian projects

- US partnerships LBNL/DOE
- SECARB Cranfield BEG
- PCOR MVA activities EERC
- WESTCARB and NRAP
- MRCSP field demonstration
- Microseismic monitoring in Aneth field

## Panel discussion on Dealing with Uncertainty

Andy Chadwick BGS

### Regulatory.

US EPA mandatory reporting  
EOR and CCS Policy progress US  
Strengths and weaknesses

### Emerging Technologies

In Salah Geomechanics (InSAR)  
Monitoring ECO systems RISCs Project in UK  
Geochemical effects of injection AIFT  
Electrical Resistivity Results Cranfield

### Visit Cranfield



# Conclusions 2010



- Risk
  - Integrate process risk-monitoring-mitigation
- Monitoring and modelling
  - History matching –how close ?
  - Geomechanical interpretation
  - Faster iteration
- Well Integrity
  - Cement quality important
  - MMV cement inspection
- Permanent installations
  - Instrumentation
  - Question of dealing with negatives



# Potsdam 2011

## Review and Performance of Monitoring Tools

- 4DVSP and 4D Seismic CO2CRC/CCP
- Seismic at Ketzin
- Nagaoka 4D Seismic
- Geoelectric measurements at Ketzin
- Pressure monitoring at Cranfield
- Phase status pure and impure CO2 fluid rock interactions
- InSAR geomechanical Inversion, summary of LBNL/LLNL work.

## Demonstration of No Leakage

- Recent IEAGHG Studies
  - Quantification of leakage Imperial College
  - Monitoring of mobilised substances CSIRO/CO2CRC

## CCS in the CDM

### Data Integration how monitoring conforms with modelling

Geophysics and Geochemistry

Marine Gravimetry Sleipner

Near well bore characterization PNG and DTS GFZ Ketzin

Geophysical modelling from geoelectric and seismic GFZ Ketzin

History matching Otway

History matching Ketzin

Discussion Conforming with modelling Data

# Potsdam 2010 (contd)



## Current and future activities in permanent installations

- Gasgeochemistry in Ketzin
- Baseline atmospheric monitoring CO2CRC
- Site closure assessment CO2CARE GFZ
- CO2 field laboratory Norway

## Protocols and Strategies to form monitoring plan

- Shell Quest and GoldenEye
- Strategic Discussion BGS Chadwick

## Monitoring saline waters

- Conductivity measuring brine movement UT
- Saline Water Leakage Natural Release UT
- CO2 Intrusion in shallow aquifers University of Kiel

## Soil Gas and atmospheric

- A New approach to Soil-Gas Monitoring: Katherine Romanak, University of Texas
- Testing Atmospheric monitoring techniques (mobile laser and eddy covariance) at natural and made made leakage sites and In Salah: Sarah Hannis, BGS

## Conclusions EU Storage Directive Minimum conditions for closure Chadwick

- Plume conforms with modelled behaviour
- No detectable leakage
- Storage Site is evolving to long term stability



# Joint Network New York Questions



- **Definition of Monitoring**
  - Process to identify purpose
  - Who are the customers
  - Matrix of monitoring tools
- **Quantification**
  - To what degree of sensitivity?
  - To what degree of certainty?
  - What measurements to address these
  - To what degree of integration
- **Screening technologies by regulatory regime**
  - Emissions accounting
  - Storage security
  - What technologies suitable to answer questions
  - What accuracies, thresholds etc


## **Storage security without quantification**

One strategy is to concentrate your monitoring at the reservoir and immediately above in seal and porous zone  
Requires mitigation plans in place  
Reduces near surface monitoring to public assurance role  
In the case of leakage we then need to apply additional monitoring.

# Progress on Definition of Monitoring



- Regulatory environment has advanced – expectations much better defined, but not mature





# Progress on Leakage Quantification



- Field tool demonstrations advanced
- Good progress showing limits of precision

**Not done –  
Effective leakage  
quantification**

←  
Sleipner  
Weyburn  
West Pearl Queen  
Nagaoka  
Frio 1&2  
InSalah

SECARB Cranfield

Ketzin

ZERT field test  
Otway

Gaylord MI

Otway 2

Illinois ADM

2008

2009

2010


2011

2012






## Monitoring Strategy flowchart




- Protocols and strategies for a monitoring plan Andy Chadwick, Rob Arts, Jonathon Pearce and Dave Jones Potsdam 2011

# Monitoring Functional Ladder





# Diversified Monitoring Program Eliminates Dependence on any Single Technology






## Managing uncertainty

Actual behaviour of the injected CO<sub>2</sub> conforms with the modelled behaviour

- Need demonstrate basic understanding
- Uncertainty will not lead to future divergence



### No detectable leakage

- Monitoring tools have finite detection thresholds
- Need to accept site characterisation i.e. 'innocent until proven guilty'

Storage site is evolving towards a situation of long-term stability

- Need to demonstrate onset of key stabilisation process
- Analogue data from pilot-scale or similar sites